Suggested Readings

 

“Constructs of Courage: War Literature as Historical Source Material” is a recent paper that I presented at the 2012 DePaul University Student History Conference. It examines how non-traditional sources can be incorporated into historical analysis with an acceptable level of rigor. I do this by organizing the material to illustrate its relationship to one of three constructs of courage – political, social, and individual – and demonstrate the types of questions that can be appropriately submitted to the sources. I hope that you enjoy it.

Constructs of Courage: War Literature as Historical Source Material

Courage is a characteristic of warfare discussed by all stakeholders in time of war. Different constructs of courage often compete for control of the historical narrative. Because the Great War spawned an unusually deep canon of literature, even a half-hearted survey of voices provides the historian with a wide range of perspectives, definitions, and motivations behind these characterizations. The different genres of literature provide opportunities to examine the political, social and individual constructs of courage from the viewpoint of members of the military, non-combatant participants, and others who experienced the war indirectly. The portrayals of courage in the sources examined demonstrate how different genres, supporting multiple voices, compete with each other, and provide historical opportunities not available from more traditional source material.

In the approach to conflict, the state creates a narrative that prepares its subjects for the sacrifice required. To be successful, the political construct of courage must stoke nationalist passion and equate action with morality. To maintain this courage, the state is motivated to censor anything that might conflict with it. Journalism accounts of the front, letters from enlisted men, and subversive literature were all controlled to prevent direct contradictions to the messaging that the state produced for the public. Because of this, the sources examined don’t define the political construct of courage as much as they reflect it through their challenges to it. Bertrand Russell and Edmund Dene Morel warned British subjects that their sacrifices were not for a greater moral good, but for ordinary purposes.

General Joffre with the girls Alsace and Lorraine

One way the state can support its cause is through imagery and memorabilia, whether it actively produces the items or simply encourages their distribution. National flags and memorial souvenirs – like those created and collected by the townspeople in Under Fire – provided static reminders with which the population could regularly engage.[1] But the best example, spanning nearly a century in France, were the images d’Epinal, a series of mass-produced posters which provided a concise, graphic and popular vector for disseminating a nationalist message and avoiding the examination of difficult themes and moral judgments. By the start of the Great War, the printers of Epinal were producing an estimated 3.6 million pieces, much of it infused with a combination of nationalist and religious imagery.[2] The popularity of these sources indicates how the state could advance an effective portrayal of courage, honor and national pride.

Two men who not only illustrated the political construct but also courageously challenged it were E.D. Morel and Bertrand Russell. Morel was French-born to an English mother, and after his father died he accompanied his mother back to England, where he eventually became a naturalized citizen. Prior to the war, he had earned a good reputation from his investigative reporting on Belgian abuses in the Congo, and even run for a Labour seat in the House of Commons. Morel used his 1916 analysis Truth and the War to attack the underpinnings of the nation’s political construct of courage, and directly challenge the legitimacy of those in power. In his epilogue he writes,

At this spectacle apprehension and rage possess you. For you have staked all on ‘Victory,’ and if ‘Victory’ is for none of you, therein your common doom is writ; the doom of your systems, your caste-privileges, your monopoly of the sources of production, your unfettered command of the labour of millions of men…[3]

But this is nothing compared to his damnation of the Foreign Office. In the chapter “Betrayal of the Nation, 1906-1911” Morel asserts the conflagration could have been avoided with “…high and honest statesmanship, not bad and furtive diplomacy.”[4] His attacks call into question the fundamentals of a political construct of courage: unavoidability, moral certitude, and shared sacrifice.

Bertrand Russell, the 3rd Earl Russell and a prominent British intellectual, was a prolific writer and critic of the war. The 14th volume of his collected papers is titled Pacifism and Revolution, 1916-18, and not only led to, but was partially written during, his imprisonment for “…having made a statement ‘intended and likely’ to prejudice the relations of this country with the United States.”[5] Like Morel, Russell illustrates the illegitimate process the state uses to create a political construct of courage. His 1917 essay “The Price of Vengeance” attempts to moderate the absolute difference between the factions that a national narrative asserts, instead claiming that war is the great moral threat, not another nation. The danger of following the national narrative is to “…become willing to endure vastly greater evils than those that we set out to avenge.”[6] Russell’s argument discredits the notion that a nation can effectively manage the ever-increasing intransigence in the national attitude once they have begun manipulating the political construct of courage (and other emotional narratives.) Only sustained dissidence by credible authorities in society can possibly provide an alternative narrative.

The acts of Morel and Russell not only highlight the political construct of courage, but also exhibit courageousness. Both had excellent reputations before the war, Morel had a wife and family, and both men were above conscription age (at least at the time of their dissent). If they had remained silent, they could have lived out the war in comfort. Their dissent jeopardized almost everything they had. And while they did not offer their lives like the soldiers on the front, many on all sides of the debate have argued that – of the choice between death and living with ruination – death is the lesser price to pay.[7] Russell and Morel exemplified a different, yet equally valid, form of courageousness.

Those outside of the war effort adopt the social construct of courage. This narrative functions as an inter-generational communication, providing understanding between older and younger generations. It parallels the political narrative, but serves different purposes. For the younger generation, it rallies support for the war, and encourages youth to do their duty, as illustrated by the compulsion of Vera Brittain’s circle of friends to enlist.[8] For the older generation, it provides succor to the families of the dead by describing their sacrifices as heroic and patriotic. Although the civilian public is in less direct danger during war, there must still be mental preparation for the inherent difficulties: casualties, loss of loved ones, and concerns over the conflict’s purpose. The social construct of courage facilitates this preparation.

In order for society to accept the need and cost of war, past horrors must be forgotten. Rituals are not only means of commemoration but also forgetting, and “war memorials, with their material representation of names and losses, are there to help in the necessary art of forgetting.”[9] As the origins of specific memorials and rituals are further removed, members of society are free to project their own context and meaning on them, often reflecting the political narrative and thus reinforcing the social construct of courage. The presence of memorials and rituals provides a link to the past that not only honors the actions of the dead but also the cause for which they gave their lives. This enables the alignment of the political and social constructs of courage.

Honoring the dead is also important for facing the loss of contemporary youth. Winter also discusses the use of museums and archives as tools for memorialization, but notes their naturally occurring and rampant bias toward the value of conflict and sacrifice.[10] This desire to provide dignity for the dead in the distant and recent past drives society to continue the war effort and downplay its horrors (so the fallen did not sacrifice in vain). For the historian, the bias of these sources and their frequent alignment with the political construct of courage presents a challenge to assigning relevance in the broader historical narrative. The strong inclination to honor the dead above all else must temper and shape the questions that can be submitted to these sources.

Once a social construct of courage has been created, it is maintained by elevating the value of sacrifice. This elevated sense of honor emanates from the moral certitude of the political construct and compels many to serve. Vera Brittain illustrates this effect when she writes of her conversation with Roland about getting a war wound: “[a]nyhow I should hate to go all through this War without being wounded at all; I should want something to prove that I had been in action.”[11] For Roland, an outward display of sacrifice is worth the physical damage that it brings. That the actual value of the sacrifice is unduly distorted is suggested a few pages later, when Brittain questions the veracity of a church sermon.[12] Social authorities like church leaders are critical in disseminating and maintaining a social construct of courage that supports its political counterpart and, like the cases of Morel and Russell, it is difficult to challenge them directly. Although individuals and historians may find success in challenging the social construct of courage, its maintenance is so crucial to the state that it will persevere while the state remains viable.

Achieving an accepted construct of social courage requires entering into social covenants. Two such covenants are cited in the reviewed literature: providing a path to Manhood and inheriting the rewards of society. These covenants are ancient and often unspoken, until they are uncovered and explored in literature.

W.N. Hodgson’s poem “Before Action” discusses a soldier’s preparation for battle and death, which is the definition of courage. Hodgson’s placement of the three stanzas is interesting and significant: as a youth, the narrator asks to be made a soldier before asking to be made a man. At the end of the first stanza he asks:

By all the days that I have lived
Make me a soldier, Lord.

And at the end of the second stanza he asks:

By all his mad catastrophes
Make me a man, O Lord.[13]

The assertion is that being a soldier is a path to Manhood. And ecclesiastical references, as well as the second stanza’s “By all of man’s hopes and fears, And all the wonders poets sing” suggest social and cultural support for the individual’s journey.

It is a truth of our civilization that the older generation makes the decision to send the younger generation to war. The second covenant – inheriting the rewards of society – is addressed in Pat Barker’s Regeneration. During a Sunday sermon, Dr. Rivers contemplates the meaning of a stained glass window:

The bargain, Rivers thought, looking at Abraham and Isaac. The one on which all patriarchal societies are founded. If you, who are young and strong, will obey me, who am old and weak, even to the extent of being prepared to sacrifice your life, then in the course of time you will peacefully inherit, and be able to exact the same obedience from your sons.[14]

Barker both defines and challenges this covenant when she implicitly asks, “What is the obligation of the older generation?” The ability to answer such a question raises concerns for society’s perpetuation of the social construct of courage from conflict to conflict.

The ranges of literary genres that examine social courage provide multiple voices for the historian. Sources like Brittain and Hodgson work together to reinforce the individual’s view of social courage and how it transfers into action. Winter’s analysis of memory and mourning illustrates truths that reach between conflicts and provide social continuity. Because the political narrative is difficult to maintain, the inter-generational communication of the social construct is important to the process. With some truths of conflict extending beyond its historical frame, it is important to utilize source material that can encompass that wider frame. Finally, it is worth noting that the social construct of courage can also be abetted by sources capable of challenging it, as when Volpatte fails to correct the townspeople’s mistaken impression about conditions in the trenches.[15] In this situation, challenging the social construct at home so that future conflicts and loss of life could be properly valued was often not part of the individual construct.

War literature addresses the individual in ways that other sources cannot. Certainly, it provides insight into the individual, as opposed to the group. It also provides a challenge to the political and social constructs of courage that are disseminated through bureaucratic institutions (and documented as a matter of course). Finally, by its nature it demonstrates the linkages between the present and universal truths by inheriting forms and cultural knowledge. War literature engages a segment of the population neglected by source material generated by institutions, providing additional opportunities to historians. They allow – and demand – a different type of historical inquiry to be formulated. The examination of war literature allows the investigation of actions, attitudes and behaviors not reflected in many traditional sources.

The soldiers’ song “I Want to Go Home” tells of men’s fears of the trenches and death:

Take me over the sea,
Where the snipers they can’t get at me.
Oh my, I don’t want to die, I want to go home.[16]

As a song, it allows the men to engage it with a detachment that protects them from charges of cowardice. In this construct, the individual courage comes from honestly confronting their fear of death. This is a direct challenge to the political construct of courage cited in Ellis, where he noted that the military élite “yearned for the glorious charge, particularly by the cavalry, in which the courage and impetus of man and beast was sufficient to bring victory.”[17]

In addition to considering courage frail, it was also viewed as situational. Ivor Gurney’s “On Somme” describes courage as a mask for cowardice, which certainly conflicts with political and social notions of courage and fortitude.

But still a hope I kept that were we there going over,
I, in the line, I should not fail, but take recover
From others’ courage, and not as coward be known.

And then, to close:

Courage kept, but ready to vanish at first touch.[18]

Here we find that courage is often gained from your comrades, if for no other reason than to not be seen as a coward. Thus, courage is situational, and as he notes in the last stanza, ephemeral. “On Somme” supports the complex idea of courage echoed in the soldiers’ song and the fears of Geoffrey in Testament of Youth, when he admits to acting with courage because he is afraid of being a coward.[19]

Individual courage is more complex than social or political constructs can accommodate. Instead of the mythical assertions of the latter, the individual construct provides an opportunity to examine courage in depth. By viewing themselves as a unit of a large group, a soldier’s loyalty could shift to their comrades, as well as devaluing their individual loss.[20] This loyalty led to a soldiers’ code of conduct, mentioned in Ellis and echoed in Jünger, when he recalls:

The sergeant practically had both legs sheared off by hand-grenade splinters; even so, with stoical calm, he kept his pipe clenched between his teeth to the end. This incident, like all our other encounters with the Britishers, left us pleasantly impressed with their bravery and manliness.[21]

Barbusse presents a different portrait of the soldier, which confronts the naked truth of the front lines. He described the men of his squad as ordinary and, “[l]ike ordinary men as a whole, they are ignorant, not too keen, narrow-minded, and full of good old common sense, which sometimes goes astray…”[22] These are not Titans, fighting for the glory of God and motherland, but just men who have been placed in horrific circumstances and are adapting in order to survive. The inclusion of war literature, with its complex examination of courage, to the body of source material that advances the political and social constructs, offers a richer – if conflicted – historical narrative.

Eye Deep in Hell

Of all the first-person accounts considered, Jünger’s Storm of Steel reads most like a mythical account. Possible reasons for this might include the heightened sense of nationalism in Germany (“We were enraptured by war”[23]) and the numerous revisions made over the years that were undoubtedly influenced by subsequent events. Regardless, Jünger clearly had a sense of honor and courage more closely aligned with the political and social constructs of the day. This is evident when he informs us of reciting Ariosto upon entering battle: “A great heart feels no dread of approaching death, whenever it may come, so long as it be honourable.”[24] Combined with his placement of the primacy of courage over ability in the making of a soldier (“The fellow in question was barely fit for active service any longer, because an earlier wound had left him morbidly fearful”[25]) you get a strong alignment with the view of courage and moral certitude previously cited in Ellis. Storm of Steel demonstrates the multiple perspectives found within war literature and, through its differences with other sources highlights the complexity of notions of individual courage.

The literature of the Great War and included histories portray multiple competing narratives. By examining the political, social and individual constructs of courage examined in the sources, their contributions to the historical narrative can be evaluated. Essayists like E.D. Morel and Bertrand Russell define the political construct of courage by the nature of their challenges to it, and demonstrate courageousness as valid as the infantryman, albeit different. Social histories like Eye Deep in Hell and Sites of Memory approach “common man” and popular culture sources that military or diplomatic historians might discount. They identify and sometimes challenge the social construct, and highlight the links between generations and conflicts. And the memoirs, novels and poetry provide insight into the attitudes, beliefs and actions of individuals that can challenge political and social narratives. Each type of source demands a different type and scope of question from the historian in order to remain valid, but employing them together provides an opportunity to craft a historical narrative unavailable from more traditional source material.

Notes

[1] Henri Barbusse, Under Fire (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 273.
[2] Jay Winter, Sites of memory, sites of mourning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 127.
[3] Edmund Dene Morel, Truth and the War (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1972), 317.
[4] Morel, 274.
[5] Bertrand Russell, Pacifism and Revolution, 1916-18 (New York: Routledge, 1995), 403.
[6] Russell, 189.
[7] Russell, 411-413. While Russell’s four and a half months in prison certainly represent a punishment and curtailment of liberty, they were not as bad as they might have been. Among other things, Russell was allowed to wear his own clothes, send out for food, and enjoy weekly visits. He was the beneficiary of lobbying on the part of his brother, which allowed him to describe his internment (at least initially) as “regular and wholesome.” It was not until the latter part of his term, when the conscription age had risen and his hopes for exemption faded, that he became depressed and less effective at his work. However, he was ultimately released and left to resume his routine without threat of military service.
[8] Vera Brittain, Testament of Youth (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 100.
[9] Winter, 115.
[10] Winter, 81.
[11] Brittain, 116.
[12] Brittain, 127.
[13] W.N. Hodgson, “Before Action” in Walter, 99.
[14] Pat Barker, Regeneration (New York: Plume, 1991), 149.
[15] Barbusse, 275.
[16] Soldiers’ song, “I want to go home” in Walter, 166.
[17] John Ellis, Eye Deep in Hell (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1977), 83.
[18] Ivor Gurney, “On Somme” in Walter, 125.
[19] Brittain, 305.
[20] Ellis, 97.
[21] Ernst Jünger, Storm of Steel (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 125.
[22] Barbusse, 42.
[23] Jünger, 5.
[24] Jünger, 171.
[25] Jünger, 151.

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I have been thinking quite a bit about imperialism lately, and decided to put a few thoughts “on paper.” Mostly, I am concerned about the future of the enterprise, for it appears to be morphing into something even less attractive than before.

To begin, let us agree that America is an imperial power. If our mid-twentieth century dalliances with neocolonialism in Latin America will not convince you, certainly our power projection into the Middle East and South Asia during the past decade will. As a tragic irony, I present to you the September 10, 2001 episode of Talk of the Nation, titled “An American Empire?” Many people making decisions about the United States’ conduct in the world view us as an imperial power.

But what does that mean? In the past, it meant extracting natural resources from a colony and selling them finished goods, with a little bit of tribute collection thrown in for good measure. More recently – after enslaving indigenous populations fell out of favor – imperial countries settled for financial control through loans and free trade agreements. Certainly this form of neocolonialism continues, but new imperial drivers have appeared that are assuming precedence over the old.

After the invasion of Iraq was announced, many people (mostly on the left) claimed that the real motive for war was to control Iraq’s oil reserves. This was a reasonable assertion, given the nature of colonialism and Paul Wolfowitz’s comment that oil revenues would reimburse the cost of the war. But that reasoning dissolved quickly, and was never applicable in Afghanistan. Instead, both conflicts were used to maintain power domestically. A number of imperial behaviors are now exhibited within our own borders by our own government.

The machinery of empire drives the myth of American Exceptionalism, a myth asymmetrically utilized by the right-wing in domestic politics. The myth is the finished good that we are forced to buy after the resource extraction of money and blood to fuel the machine. And, not unlike the Andean peoples forced to work the mines of Potosí, our youth (who are disproportionately underprivileged) are sent to war as tribute. The population at large gives up improvements to domestic infrastructure, a robust social safety net, and future financial security in exchange for funding the business of war (for more on this, consider Andrew Bacevich’s Washington Rules.) Like a colony, this represents a huge transfer of payments to a small group of elites.

Extending this model is even more depressing. The colonial “Other” becomes one’s domestic political adversaries, and their value falls far below that of accomplishing political objectives. This makes it not only easy, but necessary, for the imperial elites to marginalize political opponents. Even the sitting President is treated as Other: he is Kenyan, he is Muslim, he does not believe that America is exceptional. It is not a model for democratic society.

I hope I am wrong. However, in the modern world the prospect of executing a classic model of empire is non-existent, and the momentum that propels our nation is strong. Turning that momentum inward is a probable course. Unfortunately, the consequences are likely to be undesirable.

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I’m catching up on my reading while on spring break (which is jokingly called “spring pause” at DePaul.) Yesterday I read William Cronon’s “From the President” column in February’s Perspectives magazine. Cronon, who was just installed as the President of the American Historical Association, is a brilliant scholar and innovative thinker, so it seems fitting that he focuses his first column on the controversial topic of Wikipedia.

Many of the respected scholars with whom I am associated dismiss Wikipedia as corrupting. My classmates will not admit to consulting it when discussing topics, even though I can tell from their anecdotes that they have (because I have, too.) There is clearly an issue with rigor, as Cronon notes, but we need to keep that separate from what Wikipedia is: a collaborative knowledge base that will be as good as we make it.

Wikipedia is exciting for the way it reorganizes the process of compiling information. The challenge for historians is to bring rigor to the platform. With scholarly leadership, Wikipedia could be a revolutionary tool.

Which brings me to the second topic and a recent conversation in a methodology class: what is the future of the footnote? In its current form, the footnote cites other sources, provides supportive argumentation, and often engages a historical counter-narrative. Will new digital publishing technologies allow the centuries-old footnote to evolve? With new opportunities like the tablet, I envision the URL as being just the first step in the process. Imagine being able to embed an entire source document into a footnote, or linking to an ongoing professional debate from within a monograph or journal article.

Do you have any ideas? I’d love to hear what you have thought about or incorporated into your projects. The possibilities are exciting!

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A terrible war atrocity occurred in the Panjwai district of Afghanistan this weekend, when a U.S. Army sergeant went door-to-door killing at least 16 civilians. But it’s actually the public’s response to the news that surprises me the most, and the cause for that speaks poorly of our chance to live in a peaceful world.

The past several decades have witnessed a profound disconnect between the nature of war and its perception by the public. While this has always been the goal of the state, the United States military and government has been wildly successful at controlling the narrative of conflict. From tightly controlled memorials to collaborating with video game manufacturers, society has been taught to believe in the surgical strike and the moral war. When an incident like Panjwai occurs, we are surprised that such an event is possible and quickly marginalize it to singularity.

But war is not clean. It is not surgical and it is not moral. Sometimes – when all other resources have been exhausted – it is necessary, but until we understand its true cost we cannot be assured that we should employ it. Warfare kills innocent people, and it drives honorable men to commit atrocities. It destroys generations of knowledge, and bankrupts public treasuries. War makes old men rich while robbing families of young sons, daughters, mothers and fathers.

The end game is pretty simple: if we cannot face the true cost of a conflict, then we will never be able to understand what amount of desperation is necessary to offer the lives of our youth. If war is nothing more than nationalism, honor, gallantry, and virtue, then what attraction can peace have to our society?

So I’m not surprised by Panjwai, even though it was a terrible tragedy. It will happen again, and that makes it our responsibility to add it to the cost of conflict, and then decide if we are justified in our actions.

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Yesterday I finished reading Pat Barker’s Regeneration, a fictionalized account of Siegfried Sassoon’s pacifist declaration against the Great War and his negotiated treatment for neurasthenia in Craiglockhart hospital. The Great War earned its name partly because of the tremendous failure of diplomacy that led to its inception, the stunning failure of strategy that accompanied an unprecedented deployment of new technology, and the unimaginable level of slaughter accomplished by all parties. Barker uses Sassoon – a Military Cross recipient – to examine concepts of duty, courage, and camaraderie from the perspective of men who experienced the conflagration and were forever changed by it.

The beauty of a work like Regeneration is that it contains so many [timeless] Truths. In the present day we need to consider what our civilization learned from experiences like the Great War and the century of warfare that followed. Influential analysts on the ideological right like Max Boot are beating the war drum at the Council on Foreign Relations and in popular venues like the Los Angeles Times. Every leading GOP Presidential candidate in 2012 – with the exception of Ron Paul – has advocated military intervention against Iran. And in what looks like a case of “déjà vu all over again”, the media is gleefully acting as military enabler.

Consider this passage at the beginning of Part 3, when the Army psychologist Rivers is reflecting on the stained glass depictions in church:

Obvious choices for the east window: the two bloody bargains on which a civilization claims to be based. The bargain, Rivers thought, looking at Abraham and Isaac. The one on which all patriarchal societies are founded. If you, who are young and strong, will obey me, who am old and weak, even to the extent of being prepared to sacrifice your life, then in the course of time you will peacefully inherit, and be able to exact the same obedience from your sons. Only we’re breaking the bargain, Rivers thought. All over northern France, at this very moment, in trenches and dugouts and flooded shell-holes, the inheritors were dying, not one by one, while old men, and women of all ages, gathered together and sang hymns.

The son enters into the covenant and accepts a duty. What is the duty of the patriarch? Is he not obligated to make every effort to resolve the conflict before sacrificing his son? When Newt Gingrich calls for covert assassinations and regime destabilization as a first course of action, does he not betray his duty to provide a peaceful inheritance to his sons (and daughters in the modern world?) Does Mitt Romney see nothing in Iran but an imminent, existential threat? The Iraq and Afghanistan wars alone are projected to cost over $3 trillion total, and have destabilized an already tottering region of the world (and allowed Iran to assume the role of regional power.) With such an expenditure of lives and treasure, what is left to inherit?

Boom, boom, boom. Will you break the covenant, Mitt, Max and Newt?

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When Occupy Wall St. made its splash last fall, a lot of pundits were comparing it to the Arab Spring based on its diffuse structure, strength from palpable unrest, and embrace of social media. Although the group made it clear they did not have a political agenda, their “We are the 99%” motto reflected a belief that too much wealth and power was concentrated in the hands of a very small demographic minority. This motto resonated with many; all over the country Occupy movements sprang forth and the topic gained control of the nation’s political conversation.

Occupy Chicago Protestor by Bill Clark

I have been interacting with Occupy Chicago through social media, and keeping informed about various actions and events. And despite what seems to be a well-organized – albeit decentralized – effort, I believe there are some serious tactical problems for the movement as a whole. Occupy’s amorphous structure presents an easy target for opponents to sustain an effective campaign to discredit its goals and impugn its motives.

Assuming nothing more than a desire to change the conversation about the distribution of wealth and power in America, it still becomes necessary to equate Occupy’s goal as one of changing the mission statement of an organization. Changes of this magnitude, if they are to be sustained, require careful targeting and a strong network of champions who exercise authority throughout the organization. Also important is the recognition that powerful members of the organization – perhaps even some members of your change team – will work against your efforts by either directly sabotaging the initiative or passively failing to implement it.

The problem for Occupy is seen in the contrast between two previous political movements: the anarchist movement of the late 19th century and the populist movement of the 1930s. Huey Long and Father Coughlin achieved success elevating their power and influence over society in the 1930s with their programs that focused on the common man and their attacks on the powerful elite (never mind the genuineness of their actions.) Although they faced powerful critics, Long and Coughlin used their political networks to accomplish tangible changes in the lives of their supporters. Occupy appears to be following the path of the anarchists, which faced considerably more resistance and achieved far less. During and after the Railroad Strike in Chicago, business elites proved quite adept at mobilizing media and champions like the clergy to discredit the activists and portray them as dangerous “others”, socialist Europeans, and Godless terrorists. The common man, who faced considerable injustice on the part of Gilded Age elites, never considered the anarchist movement to be anything other than a threat.

What will it take for Occupy to achieve tangible results? They must recognize that simply “being the 99%” is not enough. The group will have to accept the need for some centralization, as well as work within the framework of the larger organization (American politics.) It must reach outside of itself to find champions who will carry its mission statement forward to the larger body of people who accept the authority of those champions. Think clergy, city council members, even mayors and university presidents. If the group truly represents the 99%, then building a coalition of those seeking change and those who wield power is achievable. And just as important, Occupy needs to anticipate attacks against its authority to speak, and even prepare attacks against its adversaries’ credibility.

America’s current mission statement was authored four decades ago, and has been pushed forward every day by a collaborative network of change agents. When resistant is encountered, these agents seek to eliminate it. They have been effective at assimilating this new mission statement because they understand the organizational dynamics of society. Occupy has an opportunity to be a central focus for a new collaborative network, if they are able to tweak their strategy and adopt the tactics which will insure success.

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For those interested in the history of history, and how our narratives change over time, I present to you my most recents papers, with a Robert Plant interlude. The first post is about the Spanish Conquest of Mexico, and examines literature from 1839 to 2008. As it demonstrates, there has been a dramatic shift in the actors and events deemed important. It is long, but I think you will find it interesting.

The second post addresses the culture war battles over the National History Standards in the mid-1990s. This is an ongoing process, and one that is not pretty to look at. I hope you enjoy it.

Democratizing the Conquest

Introduction and Thesis

The Spanish Conquest of Mexico (hereafter referred to as “the Conquest”) received renewed attention from historians after the mid-twentieth century, as new methods and sources became available. There was a time when historians considered the subject exhausted, with every question that could interest the white male European descendant answered. William Prescott – a renowned 19th century historian and subject of this analysis – wrote in the preface of Conquest of Mexico that “it might seem that little could remain at the present day to be gleaned by the historical inquirer.”[1] Of course, society and culture evolved, and power changed hands, or at least achieved a different balance, so that the questions asked of sources changed in a corresponding manner. In the twentieth century it wasn’t just society in general that changed, but the academy more specifically: women and non-white people joined in more representative numbers, and brought with them new perspectives that had been marginalized or simply not previously considered. And while it is beyond the scope of this paper to argue causality, it is probably not dangerous to assume that these new perspectives and questions contributed to the search for and analysis of source materials more directly associated with indigenous Americans.

Corresponding to this shift in power were changes in the historical paradigm. Seemingly anxious to shed its nineteenth-century Rankian objectivity and explore anew its rhetorical pedigree, the historical discipline shattered into a plethora of sub-genres, borrowing methodology from fields as diverse as economics and anthropology. More importantly, this paradigm shift focused on what became know as “history from below”, the notion of granting significant agency to historical actors previously ignored for not being central to events. Dubbed Le Nouvelle Histoire by its French proponents, the movement sought to overturn much conventional wisdom. Suddenly, indigenous American sources gained newfound weight, and a dramatically different narrative of the Conquest began to emerge. I hope to demonstrate that the convergence of newly discovered source material and the rise of the Nouvelle Histoire movement created the environment for a democratized history of the Conquest.

Structure of Paper

This analysis is divided into two sections. In the first section, I will describe the sources analyzed; explain their significance and their place in the historiography. The sources are listed in chronological order, because for this purpose that is the order that makes the most sense.

The second section is labeled “Issues of Contention”, in which three significant issues that support the thesis are discussed: the causes of success as viewed by various authors; differing voices granted throughout the historiography, and; the significance of Le Nouvelle Histoire. The selected literature clearly demonstrates the dramatic and exciting change in the direction of scholarship over the past fifty years, to the point where one must wonder what Prescott would think.

Description of Sources

Although many modern historians still grant William Prescott’s Conquest of Mexico hallowed status in the historiography of Spanish colonialism, it was superseded decades ago by other scholars incorporating indigenous source materials and utilizing different methodologies and voices. Nevertheless, Prescott – the nearly blind victim of a freak accident at Harvard and expert on sixteenth century Latin America – influenced his field for at least one hundred years. In the cited edition of 1934, Carl Van Doren wrote in the introduction, “Ever since 1843 when the Conquest of Mexico was first published, it has been praised and honored by all good judges and has been a stirring experience to many readers.”[2] Prescott’s vivid history relied upon first-hand accounts of conquistadores and chroniclers, and while thorough and seminal at the time, it was overwhelmingly Eurocentric. However, for a cornerstone in the historiography of the Conquest, no other work can substitute for Prescott’s.

Charles Gibson wrote Tlaxcala in the Sixteenth Century in 1952 using Nahuatl documents, a groundbreaking development. And while it would be several decades before other scholars would make headway with these sources (even Gibson would publish subsequent works without them), this book represented an inflection point in granting agency to indigenous Americans. The study analyzed Tlaxcala in three phases: conquest, acculturation and decline. Each phase gave voice to the Tlaxcalan people and Gibson argued that during most of the century the Spanish maintained a subordinate role in daily affairs. Although white civilians eventually did subvert the Crown’s authority and undermine Tlaxcalan culture, the data presented by Gibson challenged the entrenched Eurocentric narrative of the Conquest that indigenous cultures were completely subsumed. Also significant was the positive reception the book received from not only historians but also scholars in fields such as anthropology, economics and demography. Tlaxcala in the Sixteenth Century asked new questions of new data and helped to revitalize colonial Latin America scholarship.

In 1982, Tzvetan Todorov – a Bulgarian-born linguist living in Paris – published The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other (the English edition appeared two years later.) Todorov attempted to explain the Conquest through the identification and sublimation of “the other.” He accepted the known historical events but questioned the longstanding narrative of Spanish strategic, technological and moral superiority. Instead, he examined the role of myth and communication in determining the actions of conquest stakeholders. Throughout the book Todorov employed his knowledge of semiotics to provide an explanation for the curious results of Cortés’ mission while removing the cultural bias of past chroniclers and historians. In this endeavor he was only partially successful, as will be argued later, but the book made a tremendous effort to present an alternative argument, if not an alternative voice. Unfortunately in doing so it relied upon differences in culture to explain the outcome, even if Todorov refrained from judgment. Because of this, The Conquest of America fell into a category of hybrid works: those that defined the transition from the Eurocentric narrative to a narrative of equal agency.

Nine years later Inga Clendinnen, an Australian ethno-historian, published two significant works. Her article “Fierce and Unnatural Cruelty: Cortés and the Conquest of Mexico” appeared in the journal Representations. Clendinnen began by redefining the expectations of Spanish success, and then advanced a more balanced view of political prowess and military success. She argued against the ethnocentric models advanced by Prescott and Todorov (claiming his concept of “the other” was very similar to cultural superiority), instead focusing on politics and miscommunication. Because of this, the image of the Conquest portrayed was indefinite, costly, and a failure in many respects. When she summarized with, “[i]f for Indian warriors the lesson that their opponents were barbarians was learned early, for Spaniards, and for Cortés, that lesson was learned most deeply only in the final stages…”[3] her clear intent was to validate the agency of the indigenous people in defining the shape of Spanish colonization.

At the same time her book Aztecs was published. It was Clendinnen’s ethnohistorical account of the Mexica people, and it represented a new wave of scholarship in the historiography of the Conquest. Aztecs was an interpretation of events centered on indigenous life and its response to the arrival of the Spaniards. Clendinnen made it very clear that her work was “inescapably quixotic”, and focused “less on words than actions, and especially ritual actions, not only because they are the best documented, but because of their revelatory potential.”[4]

James Lockhart’s The Nahuas After the Conquest was published in 1992, and represented a social history of the Indians of central Mexico from the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries. Lockhart utilized primary sources more recently available, from court records to land titles to probanzas. Although similar documents were previously known, his focus was those created by the indigenous Nahuas, as opposed to previously examined Spanish records. The difference in focus shifted the narrative voice back to the indigenous population, and presented a history that illustrates the agency of natives. The book detailed eight areas of life, including social organization, kinship structure, class, religion, and cultural expression. Unlike Clendinnen, Lockhart was less concerned with interpretation, but they shared a criticism of the Eurocentric narrative that dominated the historiography into the late twentieth century. The Nahuas After the Conquest successfully demonstrated that the indigenous Americans were part of an ongoing dialectic in colonial Latin America, shaping the social and cultural landscape even while bending to the forces imposed upon them.

The esteemed and prolific Latin American scholar Matthew Restall wrote a revisionist history of the conquest in 2003 entitled Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest. His choice of the number seven was deliberate albeit far-reaching. However, Restall did a credible job of debunking existing myths in the Spanish Conquest narrative, and in this particular book he was content to attack a substantial amount of the historiography. With new primary and secondary source material available, Seven Myths set aside narrative elements of European exceptionalism, the sudden and complete conquest, Spanish apotheosis and the nobility of the conquistador, paving the way for new scholarship addressing different voices and questions. In relation to other literature reviewed in this analysis, Seven Myths attempted to reset much of the Conquest history.

Also in 2003, Camilla Townsend’s “Burying the White Gods: New Perspectives on the Conquest of Mexico” was published in The American Historical Review. Townsend sought to debunk the apotheosis myth much like Restall, but relied heavily on the notion that Spanish technology was critical to affecting a successful conclusion to the Conquest. She began her article with the assertion that the Mexicans “…knew before we did, it seems, that technology was the crux.”[5] For the remainder of the article, Townsend examined military hardware, logistical supply chains, disease and even agricultural components in the Mexica diet to support the idea that the Spanish successfully concluded the Conquest without cultural superiority or the aura of omnipotence. Additionally, she examined the Quetzalcoatl myth directly, and found a number of discrepancies that damage the credibility of the narrative that Moctezuma was paralyzed by religious superstition and unable to act decisively. Very damaging was the research cited from Susan Gillespie, who proved from an inventory of contemporary sources that the Quetzalcoatl myth as we understand it did not even exist until the 1560s.[6] Although criticized by her contemporaries for relying too much on the role of technology, “Burying the White Gods” fit well in the modern effort to present a rational, culturally neutral explanation of Spanish success.

Ross Hassig’s Mexico and the Spanish Conquest represented a subsequent stage in the historiography of the Conquest. Hassig, a historical anthropologist focusing on Mesoamerica, dismissed most of the arguments requiring European superiority, advanced technology, or cultural differences. Instead, he asserted that the success of the Conquest could be explained by Indian manipulation of the Spanish to achieve their political ends, and the perfidy of Cortés at a crucial moment.[7] The book began with a structural analysis of the genesis of the Aztec empire, and decisions made by the Mexica to build an economic hegemony across central Mexico. Once Hassig established the Aztec’s choice to favor economic reach over military control, he could demonstrate the precarious hold that the Mexica maintained over other cities. When Cortés arrived and battled the Tlaxcalans, the political and military situation prejudiced the Tlaxcalans to enter into an alliance with the Spanish, who were then manipulated to disrupt the political balance in central Mexico and create a new order favorable to non-Aztec stakeholders. While this was not as beneficial for the Tlaxcalans as they had planned, it does fit the available source material without relying on improbable or weakly supported assertions.

The last and most recent article in this analysis was Amos Megged’s “Testimonies of the Spanish-Indigenous Conquest: Hernando Cortés, Tepexic, and the Mixtecs, 1521-1590.” Published in 2008, Megged examined a different region of central Mexico just subsequent to the fall of Tenochtitlan, controlled by the Popollocans of Tepexi. Megged’s argument harmonized with Hassig, for he demonstrated that Indian elites from Tepexi allied themselves with the Spanish in order to not only maintain their own local power and standing but also engage in their own conquest of other cities toward the Pacific coast. Such an alliance eliminated the threat and resource drain facing both the Popollocans and Spanish, provided the Spanish with a proxy army to the Oaxacan valley, and greatly expanded the wealth of the Popollocan elite. Like Hassig, Megged illustrated tensions – if not outright derision – felt by Tepexi towards Tenochtitlan that eroded loyalties and encouraged the adoption of Spanish relations. Megged’s examination of probanzas and court records depicted a political scenario almost identical to the one found in Tlaxcala when Cortés arrived in 1519. These final two works represented the modern state of Conquest historiography and provided striking contrast to past narratives.

Issues of Contention

One of the more fundamental questions considered when writing a history of the Conquest is “what constitutes success?” Past narratives – written at a time when history’s legitimate focus was considered the powerful and political – defined success as the total military conquest of the Americas, and the establishment of Spanish culture. The demonstration of the superiority of European military and legal structures, and the Catholic theology not only signified completion of the colonization process but also provided its justification. However, even contemporary source materials did not support that definition. In reality, the conquistadores and the various religious orders established in Mexico demonstrated much more flexibility in handling local conditions. Much of Cortés’ success relied upon alliances with existing indigenous political structures, and the Church was forced to accommodate pagan ritual practices alongside of Christian worship.[8] What many have argued was that transculturation occurred in many aspects of life, and Spaniards mostly accommodated this, while natives demonstrated their adeptness at manipulating the colonial system.

Prescott’s Conquest of Mexico provided the most straightforward definition of success and the causes that lay behind it. He was captive to the European-as-superior narrative, and this was manifest throughout his writing. Hence, on page 128 we are told,

[t]he Spanish Conquerors, to judge from their writings, unconscious of any worldly motive lurking in the bottom of their hearts, regarded themselves as soldiers of the Church, fighting the great battle of Christianity; and in the same edifying and comfortable light are regarded by most of the national historians of a later day.[9]

In a single, vivid sentence Prescott iterated the transcendent integrity of the European conqueror, the purity of the Church, the noble quest to civilize the barbarian, and the rightful praise and recognition from scholars. This righteous determinism continued throughout the book, and his account of the final battle of the siege of Tenochtitlan illustrated the inherent bias in his perception of Spanish military prowess. When confronted with a Mexica counterattack towards the end of the siege, Prescott described the Spanish response:

The brigantines thundered, at the same time, on the flanks of the columns, which, after some ineffectual efforts to maintain themselves, rolled back in wild confusion, till their impotent fury died away in sullen murmurs within the capital.[10]

While a lovely piece of writing, Prescott conveyed the barbarism and ignorance of the Mexica in contrast to the decisive superiority of the Spaniards.

In an effort to break from Prescott’s Eurocentric superiority perspective, Todorov asserted that the critical factor in Cortés’ success was the miscommunication that occurred between the two cultures. Because Spanish and indigenous Americans simply related to the world in radically different fashions – what Todorov described as man-man communication for Spaniards and man-world communication for Americans – the Mexica were slow to adapt and counteract the impact of the Conquest. He quoted the conquistador Bernal Díaz as observing that Moctezoma was dependent upon divine omens in order to assess the behavior of the Spaniards, and sacrificed youth each day in order to be given clear signs.[11] Unfortunately for the argument, he noted a few pages later that the reliance on prophecy and omen were rife throughout Christendom as well, which negated the critical influence that the practice would have exerted on one side of the Conquest. Instead, this tended to support assertions by Hassig and Megged that complex cultural explanations were unnecessary. Finally, Todorov also drew criticism from Camilla Townsend, who attacked his propagation of the Quetzalcoatl myth, arguing that original sources from Cortés never mentioned the conquistador’s treatment as a deity.[12]

If Todorov’s argument is considered as a hybrid – not embracing the Eurocentric perspective but struggling unsuccessfully to break free of it – then what followed was clearly a new direction. In “Burying the White Gods”, Townsend asserted that a wide range of technologies were attributable to the successful conquest, including disease. This argument certainly broke free of the cultural/ethical superiority claim, but it had unfortunate consequences of its own. Amos Megged explicitly attacked Townsend’s thesis by asserting that the Spanish arrival merely accelerated an indigenous process of conquest that was already underway.[13] Parsimony played an important role here: the technology argument was easily attacked (e.g., illustrating the difficulties Spaniards had with wet gunpowder) while making the claim that disease was a technology ignored the fact that both sides suffered from its effects.[14] In that instance, disease became little more than a metaphor, for its employer must manipulate technology, and there is certainly no evidence that the Spanish were in control of it.

A more recent trend was to distill Spanish success down to an adept or lucky use of local politics within indigenous America. This required a large redistribution of agency amongst historical actors. Both Hassig and Megged argued that Cortés found himself in the middle of a fluid political hegemony and was willing to use that to whatever advantage he could, recognizing that he was also a tool for indigenous political players. This allowed him to maintain adequate power until the Conquest stabilized and additional logistical support arrived from Cuba. “Testimonies” presented Nahuatl court sources that detailed political divisions similar to those found between Tlaxcala and Tenochtitlan, presenting a unified set of conditions and deliberate response on the part of indigenous Americans. Citing a probanza of Don Joaquin de San Francisco Matzatzin – a Tepexic elite – Megged noted that “oral testimony presented that Tepexic’s most pressing concerns were its long-term relationships in the entire area, which extended well beyond the narrow and temporary allegiance established with the Spaniards.”[15] The question then became, “do we need any other factors to explain the Conquest?” From this recent scholarship, the answer appeared to be “no.”

The voice granted to historical actors evolved throughout the historiography in significant ways. Returning to Prescott, it is fair to say that he was a product of his time. As he mentioned in his preface, archives at the time of his research were restricted, and Madrid’s Royal Academy of History – an important source of material and knowledge for him – was a private organization. Additionally, he cited a number of private, titled individuals who granted him access to private collections of documents (including the Cortés family archive.)[16] These limited sources created perspective and bias that would influence any scholar examining the limited range they provided. Nor was it trivial to note that, in the early nineteenth-century, there was a belief that the only narrative that matter centered on those projecting power. Finally, there was a cultural bias that must be considered when reaching that far back in the historiography, as evidenced in Prescott’s explanation of something as simple as native orthography: “In these extracts I have scrupulously conformed to the ancient orthography, however obsolete and even barbarous, rather than impair in any degree the integrity of the original document.”[17]

Charles Gibson responded to this singular European voice in Tlaxcala in the Sixteenth Century, examining a number of indigenous sources that had been catalogued for centuries but not extensively studied. Gibson’s bibliography was thorough, and included the Lienzo de Tlaxcala (a painted, pictorial mural dating to the 1550s.) Three originals of the lienzo were created, and were copied through the ages, although in the present day only copies remain.[18] He also made use of several anales; lists of events detailing life in Tlaxcala as far back as 1453.[19] Reliance on native source materials fundamentally changed the perspective on the history being written. Cultural values were reflected in the content of these documents, as indigenous Americans decided what information was important to include, and how it was valued relative to other documents and data. Additionally, working with native language documents removed at least one layer of mediation between the scholar and the subject, if not several more. Even the forgeries that were noted in Gibson’s bibliography had importance, for they communicated what the author wanted to share with others, despite other facts. Tlaxcala in the Sixteenth Century represented a significant step toward changing the voice of Conquest history.

Inga Clendinnen took a more ideological approach to the Conquest, making a deliberate effort at granting voice to those who had previously been marginalized. Her admission was straightforward:

My concern in what follows is not with the world of the Mexica infant, which is lost to us, nor the hidden inner life of the Mexica, unknown even to themselves, but with expressed adult attitudes and those more oblique preoccupations which clustered around the potent image of the mother and the suckling child…[20]

Aztecs devoted almost its entire length to presenting the perspective of the Mexica through urban design, social roles, aesthetics and the reaching the sacred through ritual. Only the last chapter was devoted to Cortés and the Conquest, making clear to the reader that the history of the Mexica people comprised much more than the causeway battles and siege of Tenochtitlan.

Lockhart’s The Nahuas After the Conquest demonstrated an interesting consequence of altering voice. Lockhart built on other work by Charles Gibson, investigating the structure and mechanics of the altepetl, a kinship unit that has similarities to the Andean ayllu. The altepetl was complex and scalable, and Lockhart argued that it was highly improbable that the Spanish understood it, as evidenced by their clumsy appropriation of the structure during colonization, and the fact that it took time and reorganization of colonial structures in order to achieve optimal alignment.[21] Discovering this co-option of indigenous structure by the Spanish in native documents indicated a slow transculturation process occurring in Mexico, something that earlier historical narrative rejected completely. Modern analysis of Conquest-era Nahuatl documents not only revealed the flexible, complex capability of social and economic structures, but also just how wrong centuries of western history was about the rapid, unidirectional completion of the Conquest. Providing a single perspective from the voice of the powerful and political provided no guarantee of an informed narrative, only one that emanated from an arbitrary authority.

Most of the works cited in this analysis were written after the genesis of Le Nouvelle Histoire, a movement in history determined to discard entrenched notions of “proper” scholarship. Related to this paradigm shift was the fracturing of traditional history into a variety of sub-genres reflecting inter-disciplinary studies. Sociology, anthropology and economics have provided considerable methodological resources to the study of the Conquest, Clendinnen and Lockhart being excellent examples. Not only did this inter-disciplinary approach allow for new questions to be raised, but also sometimes demanded it.

Corresponding to this development was the introduction of “history from below”, introduced in a paper by Edward Thompson in 1966, although a similar concept was mentioned in a paper presented to the American Historical Association by Carl Becker in 1926.[22] Thompson’s historical priority was to reconstruct a narrative for common people and understand structures and interactions that occurred outside of the realm of the powerful and political. Such an effort opened considerable opportunity for interrogating source material, and also removed some of the traditional limitations of Rankian history, embracing the rhetorical roots of the historical discipline. Jim Sharpe went on to argue that not only does history from below challenge the classic historical perspective, but that it also “offers a richer synthesis of historical understanding…”[23] The inter-disciplinary paradigm shift of the 1960s created a new dialectical conversation which allowed historians to develop new frames for old, stale narratives.

Finally, Le Nouvelle Histoire sought to overturn existing historical scholarship conventions of the kind that produced Conquest of Mexico. Of a number listed in Peter Burke’s essay, four are important and relevant to this analysis: the examination of events not inherently political (Clendinnen’s Aztecs and Lockhart’s The Nahuas After the Conquest); understanding how common people were affected by events (Todorov’s The Conquest of America); accepting non-traditional source material, and using traditional sources in novel ways (Gibson’s Tlaxcala in the Sixteenth Century and Megged’s “Testimonies”), and; discarding the constraint that history is objective, and using a conflict of ideas to define the narrative (Clendinnen and Restall.)[24] Each of these works were enabled – if not made possible – by the evolution of the historical discipline in the late twentieth century.

Conclusion

The past two centuries have manifested dramatic changes in the historiography of the Conquest, and these were driven by multiple factors that converged in time. Shifts in the historical paradigm have created a new dialectical conversation and generated a myriad of new questions for scholars to explore. The rejection of an objective history – popularized in the nineteenth century – has encouraged historians to rediscover the rhetorical roots of history, while inter-disciplinary alliances have merged history with the social sciences. Cultural changes, which have enabled a more diverse population in the academy, have encouraged new perspectives from those dissatisfied with classic narratives generated by white male Europeans. These changes from within the discipline created tensions that encouraged old narratives to be challenged.

Beginning with the classic history of William Prescott, changes in voice and source material began shaping the narrative of the Conquest. Charles Gibson examined native Nahuatl documents for his history of Tlaxcala, and the concept of history from below directly influenced Inga Clendinnen and James Lockhart. Lockhart’s work also demonstrated that native documents could challenge the credibility of historiography, by illustrating the relationship between local kinship structures and the process of Spanish co-option, thus discrediting the notion that the Conquest was swift and decisive. With each successive generation of scholar, the Eurocentric myth of superiority deteriorated and was replaced by a parsimonious, self-contained explanation of Spanish success in the New World. Recent theses by Ross Hassig and Amos Megged have asserted that Spanish success was contingent upon nothing more than a bi-directional relationship of political forces in Mesoamerica, with the Spaniards occasionally inhabiting the subordinate role. This historiography suggests that the convergence of the Le Nouvelle Histoire movement and new indigenous source material created an environment that gave rise to a democratized history of the Spanish Conquest of Mexico.

Bibliography

Becker, Carl. “What are Historical Facts?” Western Political Quarterly 8 (September 1955): 327-340.

Burke, Peter. “The New History: Its Past and its Future,” in New Perspectives on Historical Writing, Second Edition, ed. Peter Burke. University Park: The Pennsylvania University Press, 2001.

Clendinnen, Inga. Aztecs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Clendinnen, Inga. “A Fierce and Unnatural Cruelty: Cortés and the Conquest of Mexico.” Representations 33 (Winter 1991): 65-100.

Gibson, Charles. Tlaxcala in the Sixteenth Century. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952.

Hassig, Ross. Mexico and the Spanish Conquest, 2nd ed. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006.

Lockhart, James. Nahuas after the Conquest: a Social and Cultural History of the Indians of Central Mexico, Sixteenth through Eighteenth Centuries. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992.

Megged, Amos. “Testimonies of the Spanish-Indigenous Conquest: Hernando Cortés, Tepexic, and the Mixtecs, 1521-1590.” Colonial Latin American Review 17 (Winter 2008): 1-39.

Prescott, William H. The Conquest of Mexico. Garden City: International Collectors Library, 1934.

Restall, Matthew. Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Sharpe, Jim. “History from Below,” in New Perspectives on Historical Writing, Second Edition, ed. Peter Burke. University Park: The Pennsylvania University Press, 2001.

Todorov, Tzvetan. The Conquest of America: the Question of the Other. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1984.

Townsend, Camilla. “Burying the White Gods: New Perspectives on the Conquest of Mexico.” American Historical Review 108 (June 2003): 659-687.

Notes

[1] William H. Prescott, Conquest of Mexico (Garden City: International Collectors Library, 1934), v.
[2] Prescott, xiii.
[3] Inga Clendinnen, “A Fierce and Unnatural Cruelty: Cortés and the Conquest of Mexico,” Representations 33 (Winter 1991): 94.
[4] Inga Clendinnen, Aztecs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 5.
[5] Camilla Townsend, “Burying the White Gods: New Perspectives on the Conquest of Mexico,” American Historical Review 108 (June 2003): 660.
[6] Townsend, 668.
[7] Ross Hassig, Mexico and the Spanish Conquest, 2nd ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), 5.
[8] Matthew Restall, Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 74. “[T]he Archbishop of New Granada (colonial Colombia) lamented in a letter to the king that six decades of Christianization efforts had left the native Muisca as “idolatrous” as ever.”
[9] Prescott, 128.
[10] Prescott, 461.
[11] Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1984), 72.
[12] Townsend, 664.
[13] Amos Megged, “Testimonies of the Spanish-Indigenous Conquest: Hernando Cortés, Tepexic, and the Mixtecs, 1521-1590,” Colonial Latin American Review 17 (Winter 2008): 5.
[14] Hassig, 125.
[15] Megged, 17.
[16] Prescott, v.
[17] Prescott, vii.
[18] Charles Gibson, Tlaxcala in the Sixteenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), 247-251.
[19] Gibson, 254.
[20] Clendinnen, Aztecs, 184.
[21] James Lockhart, The Nahuas After the Conquest (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 30.
[22] For Thompson see Jim Sharpe, “History from Below,” in New Perspectives on Historical Writing, Second Edition, ed. Peter Burke (University Park: The Pennsylvania University Press, 2001), 26 and for Becker see Carl Becker, “What are Historical Facts?” Western Political Quarterly 8 (September 1955): 337.
[23] Sharpe, 33.
[24] Peter Burke, “The New History: Its Past and its Future,” in New Perspectives on Historical Writing, Second Edition, ed. Peter Burke (University Park: The Pennsylvania University Press, 2001), 6.

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Since my recent papers are long, and deal tangentially with hubris and ethnocentrism, I thought I would post “Freedom Fries” by Robert Plant and the Strange Sensation for today’s interlude. The Strange Sensation is actually Portishead, and you can buy the album here.

Freedom Fries 2 minutes, 55 seconds "Freedom Fries"
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History is Hot:
An Unfinished Work of Cecil B. DeMille

Introduction and Thesis

On the morning of October 20, 1994 – two years after funding a project to develop the National Standards for History for the National Endowment of the Humanities (NEH) – Lynne Cheney penned an editorial for the Wall Street Journal entitled “The End of History”, in which she warned that the nation’s children would soon be deprived of an honest historical narrative about their country. The culture wars were pitched, and conservatives recognized the tactical importance of the subject of history. Cheney’s editorial unleashed an ideological debate that the academy was not expecting. Nor were they expecting to engage the “enemy” in the political arena, as would become apparent over the next few months. Attempting to create a template for teaching history to American youth highlighted schisms in American society: between the political Left and Right, the academically trained and untrained, the powerful and powerless. It also served as a vehicle for educating many in the process of doing history, its dynamic character, and its role as a lightning rod for controversy for over a century.

Much of the public debate that raged in the mid-1990s surrounded the value of specific historical events and the image of America projected by the curriculum. But while passions were inflamed by the inclusion of Harriet Tubman over George Washington, or the role of the Enola Gay as ushering in the atomic era versus ending a war against a savage empire, there was a more critical, implicit debate occurring. Although the National History Standards were published in a revised form, reaction from the political Right demonstrated that defining history curricula was a problem without a solution: the “process versus content” debate was tactical; the strategic consideration was whether agency would be granted to politically disenfranchised members of society.

Structure of Paper

In order to assess the impact and significance of the monographs and article analyzed, this paper is divided into two sections. The first section describes the literature, its relevance to the debate, and the author’s vision of history education. The second section, entitled “Issues of Contention”, illustrates the dialog in which the authors participated, specifically in regard to four topics: defining what history is and how it is done; the objective of separating politics from the historical discipline; controlling the curriculum in order to control challenges to power, and; prescriptions for improving history standards in the classroom. By illustrating the intransigent differences between the sides, I will demonstrate the fundamental impossibility of reaching a long-term agreement on how to teach history, despite the short-term compromises that were made.

Description of Sources

Published the year after her Wall Street Journal editorial, Telling the Truth was written by Lynne Cheney while she was the W.H. Brady, Jr. Distinguished Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a conservative think-tank in Washington, D.C. In addition to a number of staff assistants, she acknowledged other AEI colleagues for directing her to specific research materials that would shape her attack.[1] The book was released amidst the waxing of the culture war in America, following the keynote speech of Pat Buchanan at the Republican National Convention in 1992 and Newt Gingrich’s ascendance to Speaker of the House in January 1995. Although not well received by the academic community, Cheney would occupy a central position in the debate for a variety of reasons. As the Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities between 1986 and 1992, she actually signed the grant that authorized the creation of the National History Standards. Since stepping down, her position at AEI insured that she would be a significant contributor to the conservative narrative. Ironically, she collaborated with various legislators and former Secretary of Education Lamar Alexander to attack the very institutions they had shepherded, even spearheading a campaign to defund the NEH.[2] And unlike other conservative pundits, Cheney held a Ph.D. and had university teaching experience. These things, along with her marriage to former White House Chief of Staff and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, made her a significant stakeholder in the debate.

Cheney used Telling the Truth to reiterate a number of talking points from her Wall Street Journal editorial and subsequent interviews. It was her view that liberal revisionism was eroding the standards of knowledge in the classroom, and that educators needed to return to the time when historical truth was taught. Political correctness forced the teaching of untrue narratives in schools, and children were being indoctrinated with negative sentiments about America. Although the book was labeled a “non-starter”, influential conservatives like Rush Limbaugh parroted the talking points, and the Republican Senate engaged in legislative battles over funding the implementation of the standards.[3]

Gary Nash, Charlotte Crabtree and Ross Dunn worked on the National History Standards in the office of the National Center for History in the Schools at UCLA, beginning with the funding of the program in 1992. Nash and Dunn were both historians at UCLA and San Diego State University, respectively, while Crabtree taught curriculum studies at UCLA. Each of them had many years of experience teaching at the university level, and had received distinctions and held influential positions in various professional organizations. Their book, History on Trial: Culture Wars and the Teaching of the Past, was published in 1998 as a response to Cheney and the conservative movement. Nash attacked the merits of Cheney’s criticism, presented a history of textbook and curricula controversies in the United States, argued for national standards, and described the resolution of the problem. After the publication of her editorial, Nash had engaged Cheney in public debate in the broadcast media and he and Dunn were instrumental in gathering consensus amongst critics at The Brookings Institute prior to publishing the standards.[4] History on Trial became a cornerstone book in the analysis of the National History Standards debate due to the experience and centrality of these three authors.

James Loewen, a sociologist, author and lecturer on education, wrote Teaching What Really Happened: How to Avoid the Tyranny of Textbooks & Get Students Excited About Doing History in 2010. Loewen details a number of experiences in which “textbook wars” between political factions on local and state school boards compromised the integrity of the history curriculum. At a general level he made a similar argument as Cheney, but from the Left and without the unsupported accusations. The book demonstrated that formulating a history curriculum is often a political process, thus debunking the claims from conservatives of seeking an objective truth. As a civil rights activist and educator, Loewen highlighted a number of history myths that were perpetuated throughout the past century, and prescribed a robust teaching of historiography to bring these myths to light. Although not directly involved in the debate over the National History Standards, Loewen’s book highlighted the disingenuousness of Cheney’s attacks against academia and the so-called liberal revisionists.

Telling the Truth about History by Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt and Margaret Jacob was published the year before Cheney’s book, leaving one to speculate about the similarity of the titles. Appleby worked with Nash at the National Center for History in the Schools, and was present at the Brookings meeting. Several characteristics of this book distinguished it from the others. The first section extended the historical frame of the debate, tracing the evolution of the American university from Puritan theology to a unique blend of heroic science and spirituality before being secularized in the late 19th century. From this was born a national historical myth. In the second section, the rise of post-modernism and democratization of the academy was detailed, and concerns regarding the rejection of objectivity and truth were discussed. Instead of being ideological, Appleby et al. asserted a middling response to the extreme ideologies on either side, relying on pragmatism to weigh the forces of social, political and generational perspective against a transcendent objectivity. While they did not assert that truth could be fully grasped, they recognized it as a goal to strive for.

One article of importance was utilized in this analysis. Martha Nussbaum’s “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism” appeared in The Boston Review in 1994, and was cited by Cheney in Telling the Truth. Nussbaum argued for skepticism in the curricula, and associated patriotism (and its cousin exceptionalism) with nationalistic attitudes that encourage myth making and hubris.[5] She prescribed cosmopolitanism as an antidote and a method for encouraging self-reflection. That position was immediately attacked by the Right.

Issues of Contention

The definition of history and truth resided at the core of the debate. Not surprisingly, those definitions varied widely, depending upon what side one focused on. Cheney defined history early and explicitly, stating that what gives the humanities “their abiding worth are truths that pass beyond time and circumstance; truths that, transcending accidents of class, race and gender, speak to us all.”[6] She cited Matthew Arnold – her dissertation subject – as characterizing the humanistic study as “a disinterested endeavor to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world.”[7] Simply, the study of history concerned uncovering static truths; truths that were discoverable and would remain fixed through time. This required removing historical events from their context in order to prevent interpretation dependent upon the perspective of the scholar. A proper historical event was indisputable, for the alternative was revisionism.

Nash and Loewen approached the definition from a different direction, characterizing history as a process. History on Trial devoted considerable pages to chronicling the textbook controversies in American schools since the Civil War. Nash’s purpose was to demonstrate that the political debate Cheney lamented did not begin after the rise of post-modernism in the 1960s, but existed all along. He explicitly challenged conservatives to “…convince the public that there is, or ever has been, one indisputably true history.”[8] He supported his point by telling of Charles Muzzey, a respected historian and author, who was attacked after World War I for a textbook that had been in print for over a decade, probably due to changes in the political climate (he was accused of being a Bolshevik.)[9] Loewen examined the historiography of John Brown during the short period between 1961 and 1986, noting that textbooks changed their descriptions of his uprising from wild to bold. Given that the rebellion was over a century old, Loewen attributed the change to contemporary events like the Civil Rights Movement. This example illustrated how history is wedded to the present and must change over time.[10]

Unfortunately, the public at-large was ignorant of the academic process. With public school practices and objectives reaching back to the beginning of the 20th century, most people’s training in history consisted of memorizing names, places and dates. Changes in the discipline – even those not involving post-modernism – seemed foreign to policy makers and pundits. The natural response was to politicize it by demonizing liberals as revisionist.

Finally, the different sides granted agency to different groups. For Cheney and conservatives, acceptable subjects were political and powerful. She professed that “[s]tudents also need to be encouraged to look to today’s achievers and to appreciate the hard work that lies behind the accomplishments of the general or the mayor or the cabinet member.”[11] The notion of “history from below” – the idea developed in the 1960s to grant a voice to common people – was a politically-correct construct devised to attack traditional values and transfer power away from those deserving of it.

The separation of politics from history was another point of contention, although of much less seriousness from the Right. Cheney frequently accused her opponents of unwarranted political attacks, as well as political correctness in the classroom. For instance, she criticized Nussbaum’s call for cosmopolitanism as a countermeasure to patriotism, asserting that it was not done for the cause of truth, but then justified her criticism by asking “[w]hy deny special support to a nation that has become a political and economic lodestar to people around the world?”[12] It was this presupposition of exceptionalism that Nussbaum argued against, and Cheney could do no better than to beg the question.

Things hardly improved when Cheney asserted cases of political correctness. In one example, she accused a teaching assistant of overreacting to sexist comments in a student’s homework assignment, yet in a second example she defended a student’s decision to sue for sexual harassment over masturbation content in the classroom.[13] In both cases the student was portrayed as a victim, even though the circumstances were reversed. It appeared that political correctness was a term wielded when convenient, against one’s opponent.

Appleby, Hunt and Jacob make an admission early in Telling the Truth about History regarding politics in history. Beginning their careers in the 1960s, they recognized how “claims to objectivity ha[d] been used to exclude [them] from full participation in the nation’s public life…”[14] Ironically, they called for a more balanced approach to historical research, rejecting relativism and the flagrant politics of post-modernism. While recognizing the historian’s inability to completely divorce themselves from politics and personal bias, they argued that self-awareness and transparency were necessary to mitigate extreme views.

Nash was equally forward about the role of politics and bias in history. His views coincided with Appleby’s, claiming that “[m]odern historiography has taught us that historians can never fully detach their scholarly work from their own education, attitudes, ideological dispositions, and culture.”[15] But historians were not the only vector for introducing politics and bias into the debate. When lobbying House Republicans before the publication of the standards, staffers for Gingrich told Nash “the Republicans’ day in the sun had arrived, that far-Right party members were riding the crest of the Gingrich wave, and that the history standards were turning out to be appealing fodder.”[16] Regardless of the historian’s intent, the actions of other stakeholders influenced events and shaped the outcome of the initiative. Nothing was operating independently of its environmental context.

On the opposite side of Cheney, separated by the centrists Nash and Appleby, was Loewen. His work had an unabashedly political bent, even if his attention to process and standards was respectable. Part of a multicultural education series, Teaching What Really Happened listed as one of its goals “to improve race relations and to help all students acquire the knowledge, attitudes, and skills needed to participate in cross-cultural interactions and in personal, social, and civic action that will help make our nation more democratic and just.”[17] This commitment to multiculturalism, and his considerable work on the Civil Rights Movement, led Loewen to focus heavily on the issues of voice and agency for minority stakeholders. For him, history was a vehicle for telling stories of those who were not white and political, to complete the narrative that someone like Lynne Cheney would advance as “true history.” After all, few would argue that Thomas Jefferson accomplished a great many deeds that led to the development of this country, but the exploration of the controversy surrounding his relationship with Sally Hemmings only attacks the myth – not complex substance – of his life, while elevating the voice and contribution of chattel slaves in North America.

The third theme that emerged from the Right was the idea of controlling curricula in order to control challenges to power. Throughout Cheney’s book, adversaries were characterized as academic (and hence liberal, post-modern revisionists), and those academics who anecdotally supported Cheney’s position were portrayed as selfless heroes and brave rebels. This duality left no room to explore the diversity within the academic setting, or document the role of peer review to marginalize scholarship that didn’t meet professional standards. In the hyperbolic rhetoric of Telling the Truth, Martin Bernal’s Black Athena theory spoke for everyone teaching at the university level in the 1990s. Unfortunately, Cheney did not even stop there, making further attacks on academics who questioned the Columbus myth, even though their scholarship was robust.[18] Her use of anecdote and generalization to marginalize an entire enterprise of scholars degraded her credibility and presented the appearance that her book was a politically-motivated hit piece, one that some speculated was to protect her culpability in initiating the National History Standards, or insulate her husband who was considered a viable candidate for national political office in 1996.[19]

One example of how far conservatives would go to control the debate was the introduction of legislation at the federal level. Historically a local policy matter controlled by state and local school boards, several amendments were introduced in the Senate to defund the National Center for History in the Schools, as well as prevent the adoption of the National History Standards, which were voluntary. Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island called the amendments “…an unwarranted governmental intrusion into what is basically a private effort.”[20] The fact that a number of Democratic senators would take the position of defending individual autonomy and states’ rights not only illustrated political posturing but also the lengths to which the Right would go to control the message being broadcast. Their actions repeatedly indicated that they viewed the National History Standards as a political matter, and were willing to compromise their own ideological principles in order to maintain control of it.

The term revisionism was frequently hurled at opponents by conservatives throughout the debate. Intended as a pejorative, its use contrasted the difference in world view and goals that were embraced by either side. To Cheney and her camp, the idea that the version of history taught in contemporary schools could be different from that learned during their childhood was anathema. History uncovered an objective truth that existed and was immutable.[21] To a professional historian, nothing could be further from the truth. Even while maintaining the highest standards of evidentiary analysis, historical revision was considered a standard mode of operation. What would be the point of engaging in the endeavor if new analysis could not be entertained? In the modern era – from Beard and Becker forward – placing history in the present was an important, if not central, aspect to the discipline’s pursuit, and the fact that so many people were unaware of this highlights a communication deficit for the academy more than a problem with the content selected for secondary education.

It was no surprise that prescriptions varied for Cheney, Nash, Appleby and Loewen. As noted previously, the acceptance of history as a process attributed to the path forward espoused by the parties. Cheney and conservatives considered anything beyond “names, events and dates” to amount to political correctness, and the idea of challenging established narrative as revisionism. Margaret Thatcher, the former Prime Minister of Great Britain, provided a succinct characterization of the conservative view, when she stated “[n]o amount of imaginative sympathy for historical characters or situations can be a substitute for the initially tedious but ultimately rewarding business of memorizing what actually happened.”[22] But what was striking about Telling the Truth was the actual lack of positive prescription: Cheney’s study was an attack on views different from her own, as opposed to putting forth an explicit method for teaching history. The last chapter of the book, “Living in Truth”, provided examples of academics who had spoken out for “common sense” principles and been attacked and ostracized by the political academy. Her call to action was to view these people as “models for the rest of us.”[23] While such rhetoric proved effective in rallying the conservative base, it hardly provided a practical contribution to the debate. In that sense, Cheney very much reflected the post-modernism she attacked: truth was a concept that could be molded to fit the exigencies of the day. Just because that involved maintaining patriotic myths as opposed to claiming that the Greeks absorbed intellectual culture from Africa mattered not.

Appleby et al. did not address the National History Standards directly, but did advocate a centrist, pragmatic approach to teaching history. Telling the Truth about History treated equally heroic scientism and post-modernism as extremes, and advocated a more reasoned approach to the practice of history. Labeled “practical realism”, Appleby described the challenge facing the human scientist:

Since all knowledge originates inside human minds and is conveyed through representations of reality, all knowledge is subject-centered and artificial, the very qualities brought into disrespect by an earlier exaltation of that which was objective and natural.[24]

Their answer was an objectivity that denied neutrality, but one that strived to achieve truth through dialectic and professional criticism. They were seemingly shackled by their categorization of history as a humanistic science, and the obligatory response to Derrida and Foucault. Perhaps it was true that discarding the scientific paradigm was not available to them, but their marriage of poetics, phenomenology and natural science seemed problematic during their argument. Even if it was acceptable at a professional or theoretical level, it was not the kind of recommendation that would be useful in a secondary education textbook.

Loewen’s call for historiography as a solution was suggested as a way to accommodate multiple voices while understanding the various perspectives. Unlike Appleby, he fully intended it to be utilized in the high school classroom. With this prescription, he addressed a number of problems: teaching historiography to students – some who may never take another history class – would expose them to methods and the evolution of the discipline; studying different voices would provide a multiplicity of perspectives while providing a vehicle for criticizing the fundamental value of their arguments; history’s descent from the rhetorical arts and its love affair with science could be explored as a counterbalance to relativism, and; political attacks like the one launched by Lynne Cheney could at least be handled in a framework that extended beyond the moment. Although undoubtedly not the solution that conservatives were interested in, Loewen’s practical experience teaching history in a variety of districts informed his judgment and analysis.

Conclusion

The outrage displayed by the American Right over the National History Standards was informative for those analyzing the culture war and the development of education standards in the mid-1990s. Despite cries to the contrary, it was clear that the two were intrinsically linked. The value of the educational message manifested itself in a variety of places, from the hyperbolic rhetoric of book titles (e.g., Telling the Truth), to the fixation on placing quotes from George Orwell at the heading of each chapter (my favorite – “Ignorance is Strength” – is sadly a cliché by now.)[25] While demonizing members of the academy for politicizing the historical profession, Cheney and others made it very clear they were willing to utilize the power of the federal government to achieve their ends and drive the debate into the partisan rage machine with actors like Rush Limbaugh.

The differences observed in the way that the opponents defined history, viewed its practice, and accepted who should have agency in the narrative point to a bleak future for peacefully developing future history curricula. Defining history as significant events without context, considering those events to have transcendent truth and be immutable, and including only the powerful have always been consistent with conservative political ideals, but historians have worked against those objectives for at least the past century. While the debate ended by the summer of 1996 and the National History Standards were adopted in an only slightly compromised form, the ongoing culture war continues to target history and textbooks. The Right’s feint of invoking Orwell attempts to hide the revisionism occurring outside of the academy at school board meetings and in the media: the creation of a patriotic myth stripped of context and ready for each American to project their own memory on. In the end, the strategy is not about defining a history standard, but deciding who has the agency to appear in the narrative, and whether that can be challenged by future generations.

[1] Lynne V. Cheney, Telling the Truth: Why Our Culture and Our Country Have Stopped Making Sense – and What We Can Do About It (New York: Touchstone, 1995), 5.
[2] Gary B. Nash, Charlotte Crabtree, and Ross E. Dunn, History on Trial: Culture Wars and the Teaching of the Past (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 215.
[3] Nash, 257.
[4] Nash, 231.
[5] Nussbaum, Martha. “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism.” Boston Review (October/November 1994). http://bostonreview.net/BR19.5/nussbaum.php (accessed November 14, 2011).
[6] Cheney, 14.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Nash, 11.
[9] Nash, 28.
[10] James W. Loewen, Teaching What Really Happened: How to Avoid the Tyranny of Textbooks & Get Students Excited About Doing History (New York: Teachers College Press, 2010), 71.
[11] Cheney, 54.
[12] Cheney, 30.
[13] Cheney, 57 & 59.
[14] Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, Telling the Truth about History (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), 2.
[15] Nash, xiii.
[16] Nash, 226.
[17] Loewen, x.
[18] Cheney, 25.
[19] Nash, 221.
[20] Nash, 234.
[21] Although Cheney made a couple of offhanded comments in her text about entertaining new evidence and avoiding sanitation of facts, her criticisms of those who engaged in that behavior indicated a disingenuousness to her words. While I want to be careful about making a judgment, it is her text that raises this concern with me.
[22] Nash, 128.
[23] Cheney, 196.
[24] Appleby, 254.
[25] Cheney, 23.

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Something wonderfully delicious happened recently. I had to read Steve Stern’s fascinating monograph on the Peruvian conquest, and Herman Cain butchered a side of beef and threw it to his ravenous Republican primary fans. It is an interesting world…

We should probably start with Stern. I’ll make it brief, but you’ll have to follow me for a paragraph or two.

Stern is of a historiographical genre that seeks to remove Eurocentrism from the conquest myth, and discover a realistic process by which we can explain how 200 Spaniards managed to gain control of a population of millions in 16th century Peru. In 1982, he wrote a ground-breaking book titled Peru’s Indian Peoples and the Challenge of the Spanish Conquest, which examined mutual political and economic objectives of the foreign and indigenous stakeholders. Stern examines a basic economic unit in Peru called the allyu, which is basically a kinship network based on common ancestor worship (don’t leave yet.) The allyu allows for an extended group to be self-sufficient while individuals within it can specialize in tasks (e.g., weaving, farming.) This structure proved really useful in Andean regions where subsistence farming was normative. When the Spaniards arrived and achieved the authority to exact tribute, they recognized the necessity of maintaining the allyu. This proved to be a successful strategy for several decades.

In 1570, Governor Francisco Toledo enacted a new economic plan, designed to increase the capacity of resource extraction. A new layer of tribute was added to provide labor for the mercury and silver mines. This posed a threat to the self-sufficiency of the allyu, for the ability of working men to contribute was reduced by their obligation to the state. Many were encouraged to leave the allyu and “attach” themselves directly to Spanish landowners in a form of indentured servitude. This was great for the Spanish who were able to circumvent the influence of allyu chieftains, but it destroyed the economic unit that had provided self-sufficiency for Peru’s indigenous population.

What does this have to do with Herman Cain? Two weeks ago he told the Wall Street Journal that people who weren’t rich should blame themselves. Earlier this week during a Republican primary debate he doubled-down on the statement. I can only assume that Cain is being disingenuous, because no one can really be that stupid. Here’s the video:

The American middle class has been under assault for three decades, and the results are clear enough to give social scientists a woody: real wages are stagnant, the saving rate is down, wealth distribution is less equal than any time since the Gilded Age. America has a record number of people without medical insurance, and a record number of people on public assistance. Herman Cain wants you to believe that this is your fault. But like Governor Toledo, Cain needs to take responsibility for the consequences of his policies.

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© 2011 The Dialectic Suffusion theme by Sayontan Sinha